The most powerful type of group of modern times is the nation-state. However, since its inglorious heyday in the late 19 th and early 20 th century, its highly autonomous nature has been curbed, externally through the role played by numerous international organisations, internally through the decline in popularity of insular protectionism and the socialist/communist need to centralise control in the state apparatus, as well as by the growth of other centres of power. One such centre of power is the corporation. According to the title of one book, they are 'imperial', 2 according to another, they might rule the world. 3 Shell
Nigeria acts in some ways like a government, spending over $50 million per year in infrastructure projects, consulting those affected by its activity in order to ensure, if not its FACILITATION AND CONTROL For our purposes, incorporation law can be considered as having two aspects. The first is its facilitative capacity, giving the grouping its legal form and the legal mechanisms which enable it to function. The second is its ability to regulate the corporation.
Until the recent growth in the importance of the corporation, these aspects received relatively little attention outside the sphere of company law. concepts were slow to develop beyond such ancient ideas as the commenda contract/company on the European mainland (a kind of limited partnership, in which one party contributed capital and the other commercial expertise, the investor's liability in the venture being limited to the capital contributed; it gave rise to statutory equivalents in civilian legal systems) and the more recent, if still venerable, trust in England.
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It was only after the Industrial Revolution, when advances in technology allowed and required the mass concentration and exploitation of resources, that the corporation became a major force. Without wishing to minimise the importance of the long history during which the component ideas were developed, it is not too inaccurate to point to this period as the turning point in facilitative ideas, because it is when the major such idea, incorporation, was made easily available to the general population by simple registration.
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On the regulatory side the nation-state was concerned to submit corporations to its control and prevent them from threatening the power of the state by becoming 'independent commonwealths within the kingdom'. 12 An important method used in the taming process was the assumption by the nation-state of the leading role in giving legal form to corporations. In the common law, one way of achieving this was the reservation to the state of the grant of 10 For a history of the commenda and its relationship to other similar contracts, see JH Pryor 'The Origins of the legal personality (the 'concession theory'); in French law legal personality is granted by caselaw, but in practice registration is a pre-requisite to this recognition as far as companies are concerned. 13 Whatever the theoretical method used, the state gave itself the power to impose restrictions on corporations by incorporating those restrictions into the very structure of their legal existence.
THE ENTERPRISE, THE LEGAL ENTITY AND THE MISMATCH
There are, however, fundamental problems with the approach to regulation just described. In order to understand them it is necessary to understand the nature of the corporation, the way in which it takes legal form, and the separation which took place between the real-world grouping (which will be called, from this point on, the 'enterprise') and the legal construct which was created in order to give it legal standing (the 'legal entity').
The Enterprise
The enterprise is what the lay person thinks of as the corporation, in other words (roughly speaking) a group of people acting with a common purpose for commercial gain. Examples of such groups are IBM, Microsoft and Shell. Space does not permit a detailed ontological analysis. Suffice it to say that it can be regarded as a unit for everyday purposes, despite being made up of various human and other components. This approach is justifiable because the group has a kind of reality, constituted by a difference between the outcomes possible with a coordinated group and those which are possible with an uncoordinated collection of 
The Legal Entity
The legal entity has a different reality. Unlike the enterprise, which is composed of parts which have a physical existence, the legal entity is a pure abstraction with no physical parts, an invention of the law. It has a certain reality which, like that of the enterprise, derives from a difference in outcomes as between its 'existence' and 'non-existence'. With the legal entity, though, the difference is determined by the law. If the law determines that 'a company exists', this in fact means that the participants in 'the company' have different rights and obligations from those which they would have had if 'the company did not exist'. In other words, going through the formalities of 'company formation' results in different legal outcomes for the participants than those which would have obtained if the formalities had not been observed.
Examples of the legal entity include IBM United Kingdom Holdings Limited, Microsoft
System Sales UK Limited and Shell & BP Services Limited.
In the legal entity the messiness of the enterprise is artificially tidied up. The roles of the participants are referred to in the language of the legal entity as if they were people ('shareholders', 'directors' and 'employees'). Different rights and obligations are assigned to those roles. The legal entity can be represented as follows. The difference between the reality of the enterprise and that of the legal entity resulted in a split between the two. The legal entity, originally designed to be the legal clothing of the enterprise, can be used simply to alter the legal relationships between individuals who 'form a company' as amongst themselves and as between them and other individuals in the complete absence of any underlying enterprise. To take the example of a company with limited liability, I can form a single shareholder company which borrows £100 from you. Effectively, I have borrowed the money, there is nobody else involved in the company and there is no enterprise behind it. However, so long as there are no circumstances
Legal Entity Shareholders Shares
Assets Management
Employees Creditors
The outside world The company present which might allow the 'veil of incorporation' to be lifted, if the company fails to pay you, I am not liable.
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The Mismatch
Once the distinct and separate nature of the legal entity was realised, it became possible to create the various types of legal entities which we have today, disconnected (either wholly or partially) from any real enterprise, entities which we call 'subsidiaries', 'dormant companies', 'off-the-shelf companies' and so on. This is not to say that there is no link between enterprises and legal entities. Most enterprises act through one or more legal entities and many legal entities are connected in some way to an enterprise.
A consequence of the difference in the natures of the two phenomena is the difference in their relationship to the nation-state.
The legal entity is a creation of the law, that is, of a jurisdiction, therefore its nature is inevitability jurisdictional, therefore national or sub-national. 16 As the European Court of Justice put it: 'unlike natural persons, companies exist only by virtue of the national legal system which governs their incorporation and operation.' 16 Although not strictly correct, the word 'national' has been used here in preference to 'municipal' to denote the law of a jurisdiction, since the impetus for corporate regulation comes from the nation-state, and 'municipal' could be construed as referring to a sub-division of the nation-state. 
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The enterprise, though, is only artificially definable by reference to a nation-state. As the privatising governments of the Thatcher era discovered, in a globalised world without foreign exchange, ownership, or management restrictions, capital has neither nationality nor passport, and management can be of any nationality, as can employees. So enterprises are essentially non-national:
For business purposes the boundaries that separate one nation from another are no more real than the equator. They are merely convenient demarcations of ethnic, linguistic and cultural entities. The non-national nature of the enterprise can be roughly represented as follows. 
The Enterprise
The dotted lines indicate some real-world link to the jurisdiction in question, such as a business activity in that place.
The link between a legal entity and its jurisdiction can be represented as follows. The fact that the enterprise is non-national and the legal entity national poses a regulatory problem. Enterprises can in theory choose their incorporation law, and therefore the degree of control exercised by it, so long as they can find a 'host' jurisdiction prepared to allow them to incorporate in that jurisdiction.
The ability of an enterprise to shop around in this way should not be exaggerated. If it wishes to incorporate, it must choose at least one jurisdiction in which to do so, and sometimes will be obliged, either by legal or commercial constraints, to be represented by a legal entity in a jurisdiction with a more onerous incorporation law than it would wish.
However, the possible consequences of the evasion of incorporation law regulation by choice of incorporation jurisdiction do merit consideration.
VARIETIES OF NATIONAL CONTROL
Since corporate regulation effected by incorporation law is still national, it can vary quite significantly from one jurisdiction to another. These variations derive from different conceptions of the role of groups in general and the role of enterprises in particular, and result in incorporation law regimes of two main types: the Civilians and the Commoners. The
Civilians and the Commoners, tracing their ancestry respectively, in the first instance, to
France and England, and at a later stage influenced by German and United States ideas, inhabit two different mental, cultural and ideological worlds.
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We must be careful not to exaggerate the differences between the two traditions, for both include a high degree of regulation. However, those differences are significant, it being fair to say, as a broad generalisation, that the common law conception of the enterprise is of an essentially private grouping while the civilians view it as quasi-public. 20 These divergent conceptions of the role of the enterprise in society give us different conceptions of the enterprise itself.
In the common law world, private interests should be allowed free rein unless there are pressing reasons to restrict them. In particular, primacy is given to the private interests of the investors/'owners'.
In the civilian tradition, it is more important to protect public than private interests.
The enterprise is viewed as part of a regulated economy in which one of its functions is to provide social benefits, such as employment, for citizens. 21 Notably, many civilian systems have: some attempt to ensure that legal entities have an enterprise, or something resembling it, underlying them, notably by imposing minimum capital requirements (intended to ensure that the underlying enterprise is properly capitalised, thereby protecting creditors from the risks of an insufficiently funded venture); a recognition criterion based on the place of activity rather than on the place of incorporation (the doctrine of the 'seat', based on the assumption that the attempt to ensure that there is an enterprise underlying the legal entity has worked);
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and extensive involvement and protection of employees. 20 The words 'public' and 'private' need some clarification. 'Private' means that the legal system considers the company to concern only the individuals who make it up, much as a contract is normally considered to concern the parties to it, and not others; 'public' means that the legal system considers the company as constituting a powerful body which can affect non-participants, and therefore has a responsibility to those non-participants and a need to be controlled. The words are not to be taken in their French technical legal sense, in which companies are private law institutions, as opposed to public law legal persons such as the state, hospitals and universities. The doctrine of the seat needs some more explanation. 23 There is considerable variation among those jurisdictions which have it. Only Germany and France will be examined here.
In France, Art 1837 Civil Code provides that companies which have their seat on French territory are subject to French law. The seat must be 'real', and this reality will be determined by the court. For example, if the French court comes to the conclusion that a seat abroad is a sham, and that the real seat is in France, it will apply French law. This is supposed to permit policing of companies by criminal penalties, since those penalties are only effective if the seat is in the jurisdiction in which the penalties are imposed. In Germany, the legal capacity of a company is determined by the law of the place where its administration is established, its seat. In order to enjoy legal capacity a company which transfers its administration to Germany must be reincorporated in Germany. 24 The doctrine:
prevents the provisions of company law in the State in which the actual centre of administration is situated, which are intended to protect certain vital interests, from being circumvented by incorporating the company abroad.
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Other systems (notably those of the common law, but a few civilian systems have similar attitudes in some areas), take a different view. English law, for example, is not concerned to ensure that the legal entity has any significant 'reality' in the sense of there being a substantial enterprise underlying it, so long as the formal minimum requirements are qualify, companies must have one or more of their place of incorporation, principal place of administration, or principal place of business, in a Member State, and must be set up to make a profit.
In the Centros case, two Danish nationals and residents incorporated Centros Limited in England and Wales with a nominal capital of £100, which was not paid up. The company applied to set up a branch in Denmark. The Danish Trade and Companies Board refused the application on the grounds that the only reason for incorporating the company in England and
Wales was to avoid the onerous minimum capital requirements of Danish law (DKK200,000, about €27,000 or £19,300 at the time of writing). On a reference by the Danish Supreme
Court to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling, the ECJ held that the motive did not remove the company's right to freedom of establishment.
The Centros case concerned capital requirements, not the seat, although it seemed to many that the demise of the doctrine was an inevitable consequence of the decision. The
Überseering case did directly raise the question of the seat. Überseering BV ('Überseering'), incorporated in the Netherlands, owned buildings in Germany. In 1992 Überseering engaged a German company, Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH ('Baumanagement') to renovate the buildings. In 1994 two German nationals and residents acquired all the shares in Überseering. Überseering was dissatisfied with the standard of work and sued Baumanagement in 1996, alleging breach of contract.
The German courts reasoned as follows: the legal capacity of a company is determined by the law of the place where its administration is established; the acquisition of the shares by the German nationals meant that the administration of Überseering was transferred to Germany; hence its legal capacity was determined by German law; under German law, in order to enjoy legal capacity a company which transfers its administration to Germany must be reincorporated in Germany; 32 and Überseering had not been reincorporated in Germany. Therefore it did not have legal capacity in Germany. 32 Per the ECJ in Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH C208/00, ECJ at §5.
The ECJ, however, held that this conclusion was contrary to the principle of freedom of establishment, despite the German government's arguments that the seat doctrine protected creditors (by ensuring a minimum share capital), minority shareholders and employees, and prevented tax evasion. The court did furnish a caveat:
It is not inconceivable that overriding requirements relating to the general interest, such as the protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees and even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment.
But the court went straight on to say:
Such objectives cannot, however, justify denying the legal capacity and, consequently, the capacity to be a party to legal proceedings of a company properly incorporated in another Member State in which it has its registered office. Such a measure is tantamount to an outright negation of the freedom of establishment conferred on companies by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC.
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The Inspire Art case is of dual interest. Not only does it provide a further example of a common law legal entity being used in preference in a civilian type, it also furnishes us with an instance of possible civilian countermeasures. Inspire Art Limited was incorporated in
England and Wales solely in order to benefit from the perceived advantages of English incorporation law over the incorporation law of the Netherlands. More generally, the cases can be interpreted as showing that, in a straight contest between common law and the more protective type of civilian law attitude, the common law has a distinct advantage. Add to this the predominance of United States (and, to a lesser extent, English/UK) ideas in legal globalisation, and the existence of micro-states eager to cash in on any opportunity to gain registration income, legal-organisational bio-diversity seems threatened, as does the long-term survival of a stricter corporate regulatory regime, for: the company's founding members are placed at an advantage, since they are able, when choosing the place of incorporation, to choose the legal system which suits them best.
39
In other words, these examples seem to show that attempts to regulate the enterprise using incorporation law on a national level may founder in an environment where enterprises have the freedom to establish themselves elsewhere. In order to avoid any inconvenient regulation all the enterprise has to do is incorporate in another jurisdiction with less restrictive incorporation law. Such a result is one that regulators in both the common law and civilian traditions, whatever their differences concerning the degree and manner of regulation which is appropriate, would presumably wish to avoid.
38 See §63ff and §155 (2) As regards the first possibility, similar problems arise to those encountered in incorporation law. The enterprise remains non-national in nature, whereas regulation is territorial. Once again, we must not exaggerate, for the vast majority of enterprises are obliged to operate within jurisdictions in which their activities are highly regulated. But there are many, particularly the largest, which can at least partially evade regulation, for example by moving some functions to low labour cost and low labour regulation jurisdictions.
Deficiencies of national regulation lead naturally to thoughts of international action.
However, here too the mismatch between the non-national nature of the enterprise with national regulation causes problems. Even though the term is often used, international regulation is not effective supra (above, or over) nations, and therefore, at least arguably, over everyone and every body/grouping in or across nations, including non-national enterprises. 
